In this article, we present the results of several studies of American college students to explore the relationship between authoritarianism and attitudes toward the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis and Gulf War, from the time of the crisis and war itself through the spring of 1996. Our results add to the nomological network of the authoritarianism construct, while providing a vivid illustration of the role of personality factors in organizing and shaping political attitudes.
AUTIfORITARlANISM AND SUPPORT FOR AGGRESSION
For over 50 years, the concept of authoritarianism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Stagner, 1936) has provided an important framework for understanding relationships between personality and attitudes about a wide variety of social and political issues (see Winter, 1996, chap. 7) . Recently, Altemeyer (1981 Altemeyer ( , 1988 argued that the authoritarian syndrome has three original conceptualization of authoritarianism by Adorno etal. (1950) , suggested that these three themes actually may arise from a more fundamental sense of threat, which arouses intolerance of ambiguity, which leads to the differentiation or splitting of "good" leaders and "bad" enemies, finally permitting the "good" to punish the "bad" (pp. 228-231) .
Many studies suggest that authoritarianism is associated with ethnocentrism, prejudice, and moralistic hostility toward unconventional points of view and behaviors, including people with AIDS, the homeless, drug users, and environmentalists (Peterson, Doty, & Winter, 1993 ; see also Meloen, 1993 , for a general review). People scoring high in authoritarianism want to restrict access to abortion (Sturman & Doty, 1992) . They believe that the United States should remain vigilant regarding changes in Eastern Europe, and they want to crack down on the Japanese for perceived unfair trade policies (Peterson et al., 1993) . Finally, they support traditional gender roles, are critical of feminists and people who violate these roles, and personally express more tradi-PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN tional gender-role identities (Duncan, Peterson, & Winter, 1997) .
During the Vietnam War, authoritarianism was positively correlated with endorsement of U.S. involvement and support for invading North Vietnam (Izzett, 1971) and negatively correlated with participating in antiwar protests and other forms of activism (Granberg & Corrigan, 1972) . Such attitudes and preferences resonate with the themes of obedience, conventionality, and aggression that characterize the authoritarian personality (Altemeyer, 1981 (Altemeyer, , 1988 Winter, 1996, chap. 7) .
On the basis of the Vietnam War studies, we would expect authoritarianism to be positively correlated with condemnation of Iraq and support for U.S. President George Bush's Desert Shield and Desert Storm policies during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis and Gulf War. The American and allied cause should have appealed to the characteristic authoritarian themes of obedience, conventionality, and aggression.
On the other hand, the Gulf crisis and the Vietnam conflict were not completely comparable. American involvement in Vietnam developed gradually, lacked clearly defined military goals, and was controversial. In contrast, President Bush's August 5, 1990 , declaration that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait "will not stand," as well as the later troop deployments, air attacks, and ground invasion, met with widespread (although not unanimous) public approval. In the week following the Iraqi invasion, for example, over 80% of the American public favored sending U.S. troops to the region. This approval remained above 60% through mid-N ovember 1990 (Gallup & Newport, 1990, p. 13) .Justdays before theJanuary 15,1991, U.S. deadline forIraqiwithdrawalfrom Kuwait, 55% of the public supported an allied attack, even though they believed it would be a costly venture. l Following the rapid allied victory in the ground war, President Bush had a record 89% approval rating ("Bush Approval," 1991, pp. 2-3) . Although there was an antiwar movement, its influence never approached that of the Vietnam protests 25 years earlier, perhaps because during the Gulf War, the military exercised tight control over the news media.
With such a high level of popular support for the administration policies, there might be little scope for any additional effect due to personality factors in individuals. Alternatively, it is conceivable that people high in right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) might have been drawn to obey conservative leaders such as Pat Buchanan (1991) , Jeane Kirkpatrick, and Edward Luttwak, who opposed Bush's policy and argued instead for an isolationist U.S. stance .2 Conceivably, the ethnocen tric moralism characteristic of authoritarianism could even have led to disapproval of the politics and extravagant lifestyle of the Kuwaiti ruling elite. Finally, the issues of anti-Arab prejudice, Israel's vulnerability, and the involvement of the United Nations as a partner in U.S. policy might have further complicated any simple effect of authoritarianism on attitudes about the crisis. Thus, although a positive relationship between authoritarianism and support for U.S. government policy was perhaps the most plausible hypothesis, it was by no means the obvious or only one.
OVERVIEW OF SAMPLES

Participants
To study the role of authoritarianism in organizing Gulf War attitudes, we administered a series of attitude and opinion questionnaires to various samples of college students at different points during and after the Gulf crisis and Gulf War. We first collected data in early October 1990 from a sample of 109 students (83 women and 26 men) in an upper level undergraduate psychology course at the University of Michigan (Sample A; tested in class). This was just over 2 months after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. At that time, no one knew whether the crisis would be resolved by diplomatic activity or would escalate to war. As the U.S. commitment intensified in autumn 1990, we queried other groups of students (Sample B; 95 women and 75 men), drawn from another upper level undergraduate psychology course (tested in class) and from the subject pool of introductory psychology courses (tested in small groups).
We tested other groups of students from the subject pool of the introductory psychology courses at three critical points during and after the war: in late January 1991, shortly after the air war had begun (Sample C; 21 women and 16 men); in March 1991, shortly after the end of the ground war (Sample D; 17 women and 20 men); and in April 1992, over 1 year after the end of the war (Sample E; 25 women and 12 men).
Finally, as a part of other research, we tested two groups of students from the introductory psychology pool well after the war: in the autumn of 1995 (Sample F; 62 women and 63 men) and in the spring of 1996 (Sample G; 55 women and 53 men). (The latter group was tested several months before the September 1996 Iraqi attacks on Kurdish territory that disrupted U.S. efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein and elicited U.S. missile and air attacks.)
In all cases, student participation was voluntary, and anonymity was assured by having no identifying information on the response forms. In-class studies were carried out by graduate students not connected with the course. Because of missing data on particular items, the actual N for any particular analysis may vary downward from the figures reported above for each sample.
Instruments
Right-wing authoritarianism. Samples A through E were given a 3D-item balanced measure of RWA, which has become the most widely used measure of the authoritarianism construct (Altemeyer, 1981 (Altemeyer, , 1988 .s Because of time limitations, Samples F and G were given the 1 D-item abbreviated RWA scale developed by Haddock, Zanna, and Esses (1993) , who report a correlation of .89 between this measure and the 3D-item version (p. 1108). Beyond that, different instruments were used with different samples, as described below. For each possible Iraqi action, participants were asked to check the column(s) of the allied response(s) they favored. (More than one column could be checked.) The grid was realistic: In autumn 1990, all of these Iraqi actions and allied responses seemed to be real possibilities. In addition to examining the aggressiveness of response to each hypothetical Iraqi action, we also derived four summary measures from this grid. The mean of all responses checked for all Iraqi hypothetical actions was the average force level favored. Please express your feelings and opinions, in any way you like, in the space below.
Participants were then given about two thirds of a lined page for their response.
Sample C participants were given a similar openended measure, suitably updated to reflect the first 2 weeks of the air war and the imminent possibility of a ground war. Sample D participants, tested shortly after the end of the ground war, were asked to give their personal interpretation of events, as follows:
In the last eight months, there was an international crisis that led to war in the Persian Gulf. Different people have different perspectives on "what happened. " In the space below, please describe the "story" of these events in your own words. What were the origins of the crisis? What really happened? What has been the result? Don't worry about details you don't know or can't remember. We are interested in yourpersonalversion and interpretation of these events.
On the next page, they were asked, "How do you personally feel about the result you described on the previous page? What do you think U.S. policy should be in the future?"
Similarly, Sample E participants, tested over 1 year after the war, were asked to describe in their own words the "story" of the Gulf crisis and war. The following is an example of a typical response to this question, in April 1992: PERSONAliTY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN We invaded because we felt that the future of our oil trade was injeopardy & because Hussein was "over-stepping" his bounds in America. The result of this war was to show that we, the U.S., will follow through on our proposals and we are a force to be reckoned with. The situation now is fine.
Retrospective policy preferences. In 1995 In -1996 , Samples F and G were asked to express their retrospective agreement or disagreement with U.S. Gulf War policies by evaluating eight actions the United States could have done but did not do during and after the war. Mter reading a brief summary of the crisis and war, participants were asked to do the following:
Imagine that you could go back to the time of the Iraq-Kuwait crisis and the Gulf War (1990) (1991) 
Coding of open-Ended Measures
In all, six variables were coded from the open-ended measures; however, certain variables were relevant only at certain times, as indicated in the variable descriptions below. Coding was done by the first author and a graduate-student colleague, without knowledge of participants' RWA scores. For the four variables described below, interscorer agreement was .90 or above (agreement on presence of the category; see Smith, 1992, p. 529) , with differences resolved by discussion. The objective nature of the conceptual complexity and length variables made calculation of interscorer agreement unnecessary.
Policy agreement (coded in Sample A and C responses only).
The principal hypothesis of the present research is that authoritarianism is related to agreement with, and support for, U.S. policy in the Gulf War. To measure policy agreement, we developed the following 5-point scale:
I think we should bring the troops home now. It's none of our business. The U.S. should stop sticking its nose in .... The boycott is OK, but we shouldn't be sending all those troops. I think Bush is wrong; let the UN handle it. 3 = Ambivalence, lack of information, or support for U.S. policy tempered with caution or skepticism. Examples:
Something had to be done, but I'm not sure we're doing the right thing. The U.S. response is justified, but we're just there to protect our oil supply. Let's keep the pressure on but not escalate.
The U.S. is totally correct. I think Bush is doing the right thing. Hopefully, there will be peace, but I agree with our sending the forces there. S = Strong support for U.S. policy, along with threats or a desire for escalation. Examples:
We should go to war as soon as we are ready. We should turn Iraq into a parking lot.
Uncertainty (coded in Sample A and C responses only).
People scoring high in authoritarianism are often thought to have (or prefer) a high level of certainty about the world (see Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949; Sorrentino & Short, 1986) . We measured participants' uncertainty by the presence of phrases such as ''1 don't know" or "I am really unsure" or expressions of skepticism. We hypothesized that this measure would be negatively related to RWA. Conceptual complexity. Many theorists have suggested a negative relationship between cognitive complexity and authoritarianism, especially in situations in which people are evaluating or debating prospective policies (for example, Edgington & Hutchinson, 1990; Sidanius, 1985 Sidanius, , 1988 Suedfeld, Bluck, Loewen, & Elkins, 1994; Tetlock, 1983) . Because the present responses were usually too brief to apply the integrative complexity measure developed by Suedfeld and his associates (Suedfeld, Tetlock, & Streufert, 1992) , we relied instead on a simpler measure of conceptual complexity used by Hermann (1987) , in which the number of high -complexity words (for example, maybe, possibly, and for example) is divided by the total of high -complexity and low-complexity words (for example, always, simply, and never). Although the Hermann and Suedfeld measures are conceptually similar, there are (to our knowledge) no studies reporting the correlation between the two. Numerous studies by Hermann (1980a Hermann ( . 1980b Hermann ( , 1983 Hermann ( , 1984 and others (e.g., Snare, 1992) Length of response. Length of response, defined simply as the number of words in an open-ended response, was a dependent variable of interest in its own right. However, variations in length could create spurious relationships between RWA and other dependent variables, such as conceptual complexity or uncertainty. For example, if longer responses receive higher scores on complexity and uncertainty. then a relationship between RWA scores and anyone of these variables might be an artifact of a relationship to either of the other two variables. In such cases, any effects of length can be controlled statistically.
Gloating (coded in Sample D and E responses only
RESULTS
RWA Descriptive Statistics
Means for the 3D-item RWA measure were as follows: 5 90 .20) in Sample G. There was no significant gender difference on RWA score in any of the seven samples, although the mean score for men was higher than that for women in six of the samples. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables derived from the policy grid used with Samples A and B. In general, the level of aggression of response was related to the presumed level of threat of the hypothetical Iraqi actions as predicted, with two exceptions. In both samples, students apparently perceived an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia and an Iraqi attack on Israel as less of a threat (that is, calling for a less aggressive U .S./UN response) than Iraqi execution of U.S. hostages. For these students, at least, the level of perceived threat seems to have been affected more by the nationality of the target of an action by a patential enemy (the United States versus Saudi Arabia or Israel) than by the actual military magnitude of the action (deaths of a few hundred people versus a full-scale invasion or attack).
RWA and Policy Grid options
In Sample A. there were no significant gender differences in scores on these policy options, but in Sample B, men favored a significantly more aggressive response to every hypothetical Iraqi action, as shown in the table. Table 2 shows the relationship between RWA scores and the policy grid measures. In Sample A. tested in early October 1990, RWA was significantly associated with aggressiveness of response to three of the eight hypothetical Iraqi actions. In Sample B, tested a few weeks later, six of the eight correlations were significant. Thus, it appears that as the crisis deepened, RWA continued to play an important role in organizing specific attitudes and policy preferences. At both times, however, RWA was significantly related to all four summary measures, as shown in the last four rows of the table. It is especially noteworthy that RWA was associated with the two measures endorsing the use of nuclear weapons. There were only a few significant gender differences in the magnitude of these relationships between RWA and aggressiveness of response: two in Sample A (one higher among men, one higher among women) and two in Sample B (both higher among men). Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for all variables derived from the open-ended responses. Overall, most students supported U.S. policy. In October 1990 (Sample A), the modal response was scored for agreement (39%), although almost as many students expressed some ambivalence or reservations along with their agreement (33%). Only 5% wanted to escalate, whereas 19% expressed disagreement and 3% express strong opposition. In January 1991 (Sample C), the distribution was similar. There were no significant gender differences . Overall, these results suggest that the students in our samples held approximately the same views as the rest of the U.S. population (see the polling results described above).
open-Ended Measures
Not swprisingly, uncertainty was higher in mid:January Gust before the air war} than in October, and conceptual complexity was slightly lower. Both trends were especially true for women. After the war, a substantial proportion of the students expressed some gloating (46% in March 1991 and 35% in April 1992) . About half expressed a sense of regret (49% in March 1991 and 54% in April 1992). There were only a few significant gender differences: Women expressed more uncertainty immediately before the air war (Sample C), whereas men gloated more immediately after the war (Sample E). The relationships between RWA scores and the variables coded from the open-ended responses are shown in Table 4 . Even with the relatively restricted range of policy-agreement scores (72% with scores of 3 or 4), RWA was strongly and significantly associated with the degree of support for U.S. policy before the war actually started. Mter the war, people scoring high in RWA were more inclined to gloat and less inclined to express regret. (The latter result was only a trend, suggesting that even people scoring high in authoritarianism may not always be immune to regret: As one high scorer put it in April 1992, "the U.S. military overdid it.") Finally, at almost all time periods, RWA was associated with relatively simple thinking (lower conceptual complexity), lower uncertainty, and brief judgments (shorter responses). Although there were some significant gender differences in the pattern of all these relationships in the different samples, none held up consistently across samples. AIl of these relationships are consistent with the predictions derived from previous research on authoritarianism in general and on the RWA measure in particular.
Two artifactual explanations for these effects can be largely ruled out. One such artifact, length of response, is unlikely to be a contaminating factor because it was virtually uncorrelated with conceptual complexity and uncertainty (average r = .086). Thus, partialing out the effects oflength did not change the relationship ofRWA to complexity (average partial r= -.18) and uncertainty (average partial r= -.19), and partialing out the effects of complexity and uncertainty did not change the relationship ofRWA to length (average partial1S =-.26 and -.35, respectively).6
On the other hand, the relationships between RWA and the open-ended variables could have been affected by policy agreement. Some studies (e.g., Gruenfeld, 1995) have found that people's integrative complexity is higher when they are writing in opposition rather than agreement. Thus, in the present case, students scoring high in RWA may have written less complex, shorter, and less uncertain responses about U.S. policy simply because they were writing in agreement with it. In both Samples A and C, partialing out the effect of policy agreement left the negative correlations between RWA and length virtually unchanged (partial 15 = -.30 and -.40, respectively), but it did reduce the negative correlation between RWA and uncertainty virtually to zero (partial 15 = -.03 and .01, respectively). Thus, the apparentrelationship ofRWA to uncertainty may be an artifact of policy agreement. In summary, then, we can say that students scoring high in RWA were certain about their agreement with U.S. policy about the Gulf crisis and war. Apart from that agreement, their responses were also brief, and apart from that brevity, they were also relatively simple. Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics for the retrospective policy preference measures obtained in [1995] [1996] . If the value of 5 (midpoint on the 9-point scale) can be taken as representing a neutral position between definitely recommend and definitely not recommend, then the overall results suggest that the students would, looking back, recommend a slightly less aggressive U.S. policy in the Gulf War. There was, however, a gender difference: In both Samples F and G, men were more likely than women to recommend aggressive policies and less likely to recommend nonaggressive policies. Table 6 presents the relationship between RWA scores and retrospective policy recommendations. Although the magnitude and significance levels of the correlations are slightly different in the two samples, the overall results are consistent. Students scoring high in RWA are more likely to recommend aggressive policies-those involving greater destruction of Iraqi armed forces and infrastructure, and the capture of Saddam Hussein. These relationships between RWA and retrospective preferences were in the same direction for women and men but perhaps slightly stronger among women (r greater for women in four of the seven correlations in Sample F and in six of seven in Sample G). 
Retrospective Policy Preferences
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Politics
Taken together, the results obtained from these seven samples suggest that the RWA measure is related to uncomplicated and continuing support for an aggressive U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf crisis and Gulf War. People scoring high in RWA agreed with their government's tough approach to Iraq during the crisis leading up to the war and during the war itself. In response to a range of hypothetical Iraqi actions, they favored relatively more aggressive U .S./UN responses. Mter the war, they expressed a sense of gloating rather than regret, and as much as 5 years later endorsed even higher levels of aggression than the U.S. actually used. Their support for the use of nuclear weapons (at least prospectively in 1990, if not retrospectively in 1995-1996)-in a hypothetical scenario (U.S. forces overwhelmed) that was extreme but not unimaginable-seems especially ominous, given a future with increased nuclear proliferation and other types of unconventional threat. In their openended opinions, high scorers display lower conceptual complexity, have less to say, and are more certain about what they have said.
These results confirm previous findings relating authoritarianism to avoidance of uncertainty, obedience to authorities, and a punitive, aggressive attitude toward out-groups. More broadly, the results suggest that authoritarianism continues to be a valuable construct for exploring the relationship between personality and attitudes about international conflict and other situations likely to engage ethnocentrism and prejudice (see Meloen, 1993) . Although differences among the samples make it difficult to interpret these results in terms of changes over time, and small sample sizes may have made some results unstable, the results taken as a whole do suggest that the effects of RWA on attitudes about specific political events endure for several years.
Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Gender Differences, and Masculinity
The conclusion that RWA is related to aggressive attitudes and policy preferences is, to be sure, hardly new and scarcely surprising. However, focusing on the way in which gender is involved in our results may suggest (albeit tentatively) an expanded theoretical understanding of the dynamics of RWA, and thus new directions for future research. Let us begin with a summary of the gender differences observed in the present study. Although the overall patterns of relationship between RWA and the various dependent variables held true for both women and men, the average levels of almost all dependent variables showed gender differences. Men tended to be "hawks": They supported more aggressive U .S./UN responses, both in prospect and in retrospect, and they gloated more after the victory. Women, in contrast, tended to be "doves": They supported alternatives to aggression or lower levels of aggression, and they felt more uncertainty and regret. (Not all these differences were statistically significant, in part because of small sample sizes, but the overall pattern is clear; see Tables 1, 3 , and 5.) Taken together, this pattern of gender differences is consistent with widespread and pervasive gender-role stereotypes about tough-minded and aggressive men and tender-minded, uncertain, and regretful women.
. One way of summarizing our results, therefore, is that among both women and men, RWA has the effect of moving attitudes and opinions toward the stereotype of masculinity. Yet, such a summary needs immediate qualification: Making war (as well, perhaps, as making of political decisions about war) is almost exclusively a domain of men (Elshtain, 1987) . Because the relevant attitude objects (President Bush, Saddam Hussein, U.S./UN and Iraqi military leadership and troops) were either exclusively or predominantly male, women scoring high in RWA may have been endorsing aggressive PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN sentiments and policies as guides for men's actions rather as guides for their own actions.
Even further qualification is in order: Although explicit war making may be almost exclusively a male activity, women are in fact highly "present" in warfare-as an en thusiastic "audience" (Canetti, 1962, especially pp. 132-141) , as victims of sexualized violence and violent sexuality (Brownmiller, 1992; Rank, 1914) , or as weeping widows and mothers (Shevin-Coetzee & Coetzee, 1995, pp. 16-22) . War and aggression, in short, are activities that seem designed to emphasize or enhance traditional sex roles. (Ironically, this may be only a short-run effect, for in the long run, the economic demands and male casualties of war may work against traditional sex roles.) Thus, the present findings concerning RWA may be one facet of a general tendency for RWA to be associated with the maintenance and exaggeration of traditional sex roles (aggression for men, tenderness for women), as Duncan, Peterson, and Winter (1997) have found with respect to other gender-related issues. This interpretation is admittedly speculative, but if it is confirmed by further studies involving RWA, gender and gender roles, and aggression, then our understanding of the nature and dynamics of authoritarianism would be considerably broadened and deepened.
In the social constructionist view, gender is inevitably an ambiguous category. Thus, a general intolerance of ambiguity (arguably the core of authoritarianism) would most clearly and obviously be reflected in concerns to maintain unambiguous and enduring gender(ed) boundaries: lines in the sand-lines between nation-states and (thus) lines between men and women.
contrast to the integrative complexity rating measure, which often is correlated with length (see Suedfeld et al., 1992, p. 398) .
